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Seigniorage and inflation tax in Romania.  
What is the executive giving up by adopting the euro? 




This paper is concerned with measuring the seigniorage in Romania since the fall of communism and 
the potential gains after passing to euro. Starting from the balance sheet of the central bank, we 
estimated these levels of seigniorage for a period of 27 years. Our findings suggest that this source of 
revenue was at very high rates in the period of the 90’s, mostly due to the huge prolonged inflation 
rates. Ever since the independence of the central bank, these levels of seigniorage dropped and became 
constant, at around 1-2% of the GDP. Also, we computed the potential gains due to euro adoption. We 
showed that as Romania converge with the rest of the Eurozone its seigniorage potential gains from 
euro adoption drops. Because these gains are only very small in relation to national income, we argue 
that the implications of giving up own currency are not budget related. 
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The term seigniorage was first used in Medieval Europe and signified, in the 
beginning, the profit which the mints sent to the sovereign after the transformation of the 
precious metals, brought by individuals, into coins, but with time it came to include also 
other concepts like brassage (the value of the metal the mint kept for itself, as the cost of 
transformation process) and debasement – for the currency using precious metals, like gold 
and silver, the face value of the coin indicated the weight value of the material of the coin, 
but sovereigns have ordered the reduction of the weight of the issued coins in order to save 
precious metals (of course the face value of the coins kept indicating the same values). This 
method was widely used in Medieval and Modern times in Europe (Rolnick et al., 1996). 
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In time, seigniorage came to signify all the revenue that the sovereign made by having 
the monopoly on the minting process in its realm. Even though the age of sovereigns and 
their realms have long disappeared, seigniorage, the revenue that accompanies the monopoly 
for the creation of the money, keeps on being a steady source of income for many 
governments (Click, 1998). The term is referred as an attribute of the state, i.e. of the 
government, but nowadays, as more and more governments become insulated from the 
execution of the monetary policy, the central banks are the ones which collect this revenue. 
Still, many authors, as presented below, preferred to regard the central bank and the 
government as a single entity in order to facilitate the computation of seigniorage. 
Seigniorage was very popular among political economists during the 1990’s, especially 
in Europe due to the debates on the margin of the creation of a single currency and a 
European Central Bank. These studies posed a highly practical question: how much will the 
national governments lose when they will cede their sovereign monetary policy to the ECB. 
Nowadays, with the single currency and European bank already in place this subject is no 
longer so popular among academic debates, but still poses the same practical importance, as 
in the past, for the other countries awaiting to become full members of the euro area.  
This paper is concerned with quantifying the seigniorage in Romania ever since the fall 
of the communist regime and quantifying also the seigniorage gains after a hypothetical 
passing to euro. In the pending process of being part of the Eurozone, is important for a 
country that still manages its own monetary policy to know how big the cost or benefit of 
giving it up is. Furthermore, as we show here, it is a good indicator of how the executive 
used monetary policy as a mean for smoothing the eventual financial difficulties of both the 
government and the banking system, created by the economic transition.  
Of course, it can be argued that the National Bank of Romania, as part of the European 
Central Banks System will receive its share of profit from the ECB, in accordance with the 
value of the assets it brings and other relevant factors (such as population and GDP share). 
In this case, even if the profits as an ECBS member will surpass the profits as an 
independent central bank, we know for sure that Romania will have no control over these 
profits in the eventual adoption of euro, whereas now, using some mechanisms that will be 
discussed later, it can.  
Even though there were some other authors concerned with quantifying this 
phenomenon in post-communist Romania, none of them conducted a research on this after 
2004, when the statute of the National Bank of Romania (NBR) changed, becoming more 
independent from government influence. Furthermore, this paper also presents something 
new to this subject: it computes the optimal inflation-tax rate with respect to seigniorage. 
From here, it stems the originality of this paper. The academic importance is given by the 
fact that the methodology we use gives us a better approximation of the seigniorage levels. 
Even more, the policy making implications of this paper are high, as the estimates we make 
will show the exact gains or losses of the executive as it will give up the national currency 
by adopting the euro. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the 2nd Section we make a literature 
review about the concept of seigniorage and we address the debate of measuring it. In the 3rd 
Section part we present our chosen methodology and empirical data, while the last two parts 
(4th and 5th Section) are dedicated to results interpretation and study conclusions.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW - DEBATES OVER MEASUREMENT OF SEIGNIORAGE 
 
Seigniorage, in the most general way possible, can be defined as the revenues that the 
state (as the sole issuer of currency) gains from minting currency, although there are many 
different interpretation of the concept depending on the authors (Drazen, 1985). 
First, there is the concept of seigniorage as a cash-flow or monetary seigniorage. The 
idea is that the state can issue currency (which has virtually no cost of production) in order 
to pay for its spending. This monopoly that the state had in the past helped with paying its 
debt to the domestic and international creditors, simply by expanding the monetary base and 
imposing to everyone a so-called inflation tax (in this sense, the hyperinflationary episodes 
from Germany and Hungary in the immediate following period of World War I and World 
War II are iconic examples). The states that prefer to use this source of revenue, do it for 
two reasons: the money they are generating virtually have no cost and can go directly in the 
treasury and secondly, by launching these quantities in economy, they hope to push to a 
quick recover of the economy by the multiplier effect that government spending have on the 






Sm is the monetary seigniorage, Mt-Mt-1 signifies the annual change in the monetary base and 
Pt is the price level. As stated above the executive is printing money at virtually no costs, 
but faces a trade-off; as the monetary base increases, the real value of the money decreases. 
The lost value of this course of action can be measured as the revenues from a tax: the 
taxation rate (in this case the rate at which the real money devalues, or inflation) times the 
base of the tax (the value of the real balances) (Cagan, 1956): 
 
Tinfl=π*M/P  
where Tinfl is the inflation tax, π represents the rate of inflation. As in the case of any tax, as 
the taxation rate rises, the tax base decreases due to the deadweight loss of the tax imposed, 
hence the presence of a Laffer curve.  
 
But, regarding this concept, two issues arise: the first one has to do with the fact that 
depending on the degree of institutional independence of the central bank, the inflationary 
pressure from the government could vary a lot, which in turn will influence the new stock of 
printed money (Klein and Neumann, 1990). The second issue with this type of seigniorage 
have a more practical aspect: the newly issued currency will require the same value of assets 
in the balance of the central bank in order to be backed. Because the balance will have (at 
least in theory) to be maintained between assets and liabilities in the central bank’s balance, 
increasing the monetary base (liability) will also create a minus of the same value in the 
liabilities side of the balance. In this case, what if the central bank orders the printing of new 
currency and as a counterpart to it buys interest bearing assets form the privates sector? In 
this case, not only that the monetary base changes, but also there will be an unwanted wealth 
transfer from private to public sector. This shortcoming can be corrected using a 
methodology where we can include the eventual unwanted wealth transfer, but for this we 
will need to know the exact value of the interest bearing assets acquired by the Central 
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banks and the aggregate interest rate; as noted, this eventual correction presents high 
barriers in terms of data collection and computations.  
A state that has amounted huge debts will have no concern in this regard, but a state 
which strives to become more credible for its international financial creditors will face a 
tradeoff between inflation and credibility/stability.  
Even with these shortcomings, the model of monetary seigniorage proposed by Cagan 
(1956) can be of great utility in computing the seigniorage in Romania for the period 
between 1990 and 2004 due to the fact that the government then still had a great influence 
on the central bank regarding the execution of the monetary policy and due to the fact that in 
the first half of the 90’s decade, Romania experienced episodes of staggering inflation. It 
would also be interesting to compute the Laffer curve of inflation tax in this country.  
The second seigniorage concept is as an opportunity cost: by providing currency in 
form of cash holdings that do not pay any interest rate to the holder (as opposed to the case 
of investing the money in securities paying interest), the state incurs an opportunity cost of 
money holding to the domestic sector.  
In the most general way it can be measured (SOC) as the nominal interest rate (i) 
multiplied by the monetary base (M) (Phelps, 1973; Marty, 1978) 
 
𝑆𝑂𝐶 = 𝑖 ∗ 𝑀 
 
Although it seems quite easy to compute seigniorage as opportunity cost only by 
multiplying the interest rate with the value of the monetary base, in practice is really hard to 
find a valid measure of the interest rate. As there are numerous securities (both public and 
private) that pay interest rate in an economy, choosing only one type for the whole economy is 
quite arbitrary (Klein and Neumann, 1990). Furthermore, it can be argued that this opportunity 
cost is in fact a price that the domestic sector assumes for having high liquid money. 
The third type of seigniorage is the revenue generated from the central bank’s assets 
and from the government’s debt held in the central bank. The idea behind this type of 
seigniorage is that holding interest bearing assets in the central bank, generates some profit 
for the state. Furthermore, the state can monetize its debt in the central bank; when 
monetizing its debt, the state will (in theory) have to pay the credit issuer a certain interest 
rate, but if the issuer of the credit is the central bank (which is also a public institution), the 
government will pay no interest or a subsidized rate of interest for its debt (a smaller interest 
rate than the one that can be obtained if the debt would have been monetized on the free 
market). Of course, nowadays this practice is strictly forbidden in the Eurozone and in 
Romania since 2005 (Parliament of Romania, 2004), but the idea is to be useful in 
computing the seigniorage before this year.  
Drazen (1985), Klein and Neumann (1990) and Rovelli (1994) were among the firsts to 
employ this idea of seigniorage from central bank’s balance sheet to approximate the value 
of the revenues, using different methodologies. 
Drazen (1985) makes the distinction between fiscal revenues generated from the 
inflation tax imposed on the already existing real money holdings and the profit obtained 
from new issuance of money, but also provides a methodology for the unified revenue. The 
revenue of the first can be measured as the rate of the expansion of the money rate, 
multiplied by the real balances per capita. The revenue from the second is interest earned for 
state’s net assets (held as a counterpart for the monetary base) adjusted for inflation and rate 
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of population growth (everything is computed in per capita terms). He also concluded that 
many of the previous methodologies used before to compute seigniorage were in fact 
deviations from the measures proposed above (Drazen, 1985). The problem with this 
measure is that it is quite abstract and vague in regard to the specified variables and a very 
exact approximation cannot be done using it. 
Klein and Neumann (1990) start from the assumption that the total seigniorage of a 
government is very dependent on its institutional framework and thus the previous measures of 
monetary seigniorage and seigniorage as opportunity cost are flawed. Indeed, the empirical 
data presented seems to suggest this fact; the examples put in the beginning regarding West 
Germany and UK for the year 1987 proved to be inconsistent with the two previous measure. 
As suggested by the authors and already stated above, seigniorage as an opportunity cost 
presents the problem of arbitrarily choosing the true interest rate for the whole economy, 
whereas monetary seigniorage is flawed in the sense that what is actually measuring is the 
wealth transfer of the private sector for holding base money, which can be higher that the 
indicated by the monetary seigniorage. Because of these problems, the authors proposed a new 
model of measuring seigniorage; the total revenue from money creation is distributed among 
the government (which receives a share of the central bank’s annual profits – this figure is easy 
to look for in the  annual statements), the central bank (which uses part of it for operating costs 
and for reinvestment in assets), the domestic sector (in form of subsidized interest rates for 
borrowing) and the central bank’s foreign debtors (in form of subsidized interest rates due to 
changes in nominal exchange rate) (Klein and Neumann, 1990). Still, in this work, we are only 
interested in the seigniorage accruing to the Romanian executive, i.e. to the central bank and 
government. In this sense, a more exact measure is the one proposed by Rovelli.  
Starting from the ideas of Drazen (1985), Klein and Neumann (1990) and Rovelli 
(1994) in turn, suggested that this type of seigniorage is composed of two sources of 
income: the one generated by the central bank in base of the assets it has in order to manage 
the monetary policy (computed as the net difference between the interest earned for the 
assets and the interest paid for liabilities) and the second one consisting in monetization of 
the government’s debt, also using the central bank’s account. The monetization of 
government deficits took place through three types of central bank operation: 1. purchases 
of government bills and bonds by the central bank on the primary market; 2. net funds lent 
to the government from the central bank on the basis of normal 'banking' operations (e.g. 
overdraft or deposit accounts); 3. open market operations in government bills and bonds 
(Rovelli, 1994). As specified above, these kind of operations are strictly prohibited since 
2005 – although the National Bank of Romania can operate with government bonds and 
treasury bills (repo and reverse repo operations for injecting or sterilizing liquidity in the 
market) it can only do it on the secondary market, without being allowed to keep the 
securities until their maturity (National Bank of Romania, 2018). All these operations were 
clearly increasing the seigniorage; because the central bank bought the government’s debt, 
the government saves by not paying the interest of the debt issued due to the institutional 
arrangements in each country between the two parts. 
As a note in this regard, the central bank and the government should be considered a 
single economic unit for seigniorage to be accounted exactly. This because the government 
appropriates a certain amount of the seigniorage generated by the central bank in the form of 
tax profits and debt monetization. Legally, the National Bank of Romania is obligated to 
transfer 80% its annual profits to the Treasury (i.e. to the government), but even counting the 
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80% due to the government plus the remaining 20% (invested by the central bank in other 
interest bearing assets for further profit), will not give us an exact approximation of the 
seigniorage. This is because these sums do not account for other sources like the forgone 
wealth transfer from government to the creditors for the monetization of public debt in the 
central bank (is a cost-saving measure in the sense that it indicates what are the creditors losing 
by not buying state issued securities). Due to the institutional arrangements between the 
government and the central bank and due to the fact that the central bank’s profits not always 
equals to seigniorage, these two institutions are to be considered as one in this process of 
revenue generation.  
Inferring from this observation, we can also note something quite interesting. These 
foregone interest payments that should have been made to bond investors could have 
represented big losses before 2005 since the government had no issue placing its debt with 
NBR; with the advent of central bank independence, these amount are virtually 0 as such 
practices are prohibited. One can assume that this practice will be even more out of reach for 
the government, as the NBR will be part of the totally independent European System of 
Central Banks, in case of euro adoption and in such case not even a reversion of national 
legislation can bring once more the public debt monetization with the central bank. But, it 
might be misleading to believe that bond investors will actually be more safeguarded from 
such foregone interest payments; ever since the 2015 ECB launched a quantitative easing 
program which means massive buying of bonds (both corporative and government) which 
undoubtedly have put upward pressure on demand and prices and negative pressure on 
interest rates (for some of the effects of QE on bond yields, refer to Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011 and Todorov, 2020). Such mechanism might mean that the Euro 
area government bonds have an artificially lower level than their EU counterparts (Romania 
also) which did not adopt quantitative easing measures and it means a potential loss in 
revenue for bondholders if Romania were to adopt the common currency.  
Scanning the literature for measures of seigniorage in Romania we could found some 
works done in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. These works employed different methods and 
due to this fact, yield different results.  
Hochreiter et al. (1996) made a comparative study among three economies in transition 
(Romania, Hungary and Czech Republic) and Austria and Germany (taken as benchmark 
countries) for seigniorage generation and distribution measurement purposes. In transition 
economies seigniorage is a good way of smoothing the financial difficulties of both the 
government and banking system. They discovered that in Romania, due to high inflation the 
value of the seigniorage is 30 time higher than that in the benchmark countries (as ratio to GDP). 
In a study concerned with the value of seigniorage in a worldwide cross section of 
countries, Click (1998) concluded that the average annual rate of seigniorage for Romania, 
between 1971-1990 is 2.44% of the GDP, although he does not provide a clear methodology 
nor a definition for it. 
The method of seigniorage as cash-flow is included in the computations made by 
Cukrowski and Fischer (2003) in a comparative study made across five Eastern and Central 
European countries - Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Using the 
methodology proposed by Neumann (1996), they computed the seigniorage as a sum of 3 
sources: monetary, interest generated and the one generated from central’s bank financial 
operations. In order to avoid the accusation of using such a vague measure as monetary 
seigniorage in their computations, the authors of this study state that they took into 
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consideration also the institutional framework (i.e. central bank’s efficiency and independence). 
Still, it isn’t clear how these variables have influenced because the authors did not provide any 
sort of country-specific methodology (only the final results have been provided). Also, another 
problem is that the central bank’s stock of government debt is not included; as discussed above 
this is clearly a forgone opportunity of investment for the private sector and should be included 
in the calculations. Furthermore, they are not specific about what are the rest of the financial 
operations made by the central bank that generates seigniorage.  
As can be noted in Table no. 1, which recompiles the data for the approximation of 
seigniorage found in all the previous works for the Romanian case, the results can be very 
different. Of course the periods took into consideration vary greatly, but still striking is the 
fact that the methodology used by Hochreiter et al. (1996) generates a very large result for 
seigniorage with respect to GDP (almost 30%).  
 
Table no. 1 – the results for seigniorage approximation by various authors for the Romania case 
Author/s Approximate value of the total seigniorage Period covered 
Hochreiter et al. (1996) 29.4% 1993 
Click (1998) 2.44% annual average 1971-1990 
Cukrowski and Fischer (2003) 3.29% 1993-2001 
 
To put it in contrast with other such findings, for example, Sachs and Larrain (1993) 
found that during 1975-1985, the highest seigniorage rate collected as ratio to GDP was in 
Italy (6.6%), but in terms of ratio to nonseigniorage revenues of the government, the highest 
was registered in Bolivia (139%). Cagan (1956), studying various hyperinflationary 
episodes from different postwar countries, found that the highest ever registered was Austria 
between October 1921-August 1922 with a value of 26% of the national income. 
A study concerned with the revenue maximizing inflation tax in Argentina (Kiguel and 
Neumeyer, 1995) showed that an inflation that reached 170% in 1989 was able to bring to 
the government a revenue of close to 30% of the GDP. Thus, such high values are not to be 
considered flawed or unsupported by empirical evidence. In a previous work where he put 
the basis for the  seigniorage formula, Rovelli also warned that this model of estimation, 
which was also used in Hochreiter et al. (1996) will end up giving higher estimates than the 
previous and simpler methodology proposed in Rovelli (1994).  
Another issue that will have to be clarified is the one referring to the inflation tax. 
Some authors (Easterly et al., 1995) have argued that there is a direct relationship between 
inflation and seigniorage (or what is known as inflation tax). The idea behind this 
relationship is twofold; on the one hand the real value of the debt that the government will 
have to pay in its own currency is reduced (eroded) by the inflation. On the other hand, 
seigniorage increases with inflation due to the fact that the government orders printing 
money at an alert rate (thus increasing the monetary base which will eventually lead to 
higher inflation) due to the need to finance itself rapidly and cheaply (the cost of printing 
money is virtually 0), but at the cost of the whole population.  
A number of researchers studied this link empirically, although the results are not that 
clear. The first and the most cited one is Cagan (1956), which starting from the demand for 
real money schedule, concluded that the maximizing point is somewhere between 2 and 3 
times the value of the monetary base, i.e. between a rate of inflation of 200%-300 (Romer, 
2012, p. 570).  
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Other studies’ findings are not that clear. For instance, Easterly et al. (1995) using a 
panel with 11 high-inflationary countries for the period 1960-1990 discovered that half of 
their sample (5 countries) experienced maximizing-seigniorage inflation rates, which vary 
between 102 percent (Ghana) and 376 percent (Peru), whereas the other half did not 
experienced Laffer curves at all. Authors like Rovelli (1994) cite other studies that found no 
empirical evidence between the two. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
First, as seen above, the classical sources (monetary seigniorage and seigniorage as 
opportunity cost) are flawed because they do not show the true quantity of the revenue 
generated by having the monopoly on the money creation. For this, we used the 
methodology of Rovelli (1994), which employs the central bank’s balance sheet in order to 
compute this revenue. Another advantage of this methodology is that we only need to look 
in one place to find all the variables (i.e. in the annual reports of the National Bank of 
Romania) of interest. This methodology is summing the following sources: 
 
1. The basic seigniorage, i.e. the interest earned by the NBR as a counterpart to the 
currency in circulation, under the assumption that the monetary base earns interest at the rate 
of the government bonds. In order to avoid the eventual arbitrariness of taking a debatable 
interest rate of reference, we used the data from European Central Bank on long term 
interest rate for convergence purposes because we believe this is the closest to the most 
objective indicator of such interest rate1. Unfortunately, the data span only for the period 
2005-2016, so data previous to this period was estimated using the model indicated in (5). 
The basic seigniorage is computed as follows: 
 
 𝑆1=𝑖𝐵(𝐵𝐶+Φ+𝐿𝐶 − 𝑅) (1) 
where iB is the interest rate of government securities, BC represents the value of the debt of 
the state placed with the central bank, Φ represents the value of the foreign denominated 
securities, LC the value of the loans given by the central bank to the domestic sector and R 
the value of the required reserves placed by the domestic sector with the central bank. 
 
2. Seigniorage from bank reserves, from both required and free, i.e. the interest earned 
by the NBR as a counterpart for the reserves, under the assumption that these reserves could 
have earned an interest at the rate of governmental bonds minus the rate of the reserves that 
NBR pays, in absence of such a legal requirement. Just like in a game of divide the dollar, 
the central bank has the power of agenda setting in respect to the imposition of the interest 
paid for required reserves; it will clearly impose a lower interest rate in order to generate 
profit for itself and if the commercial banks do not agree with it, there is not much they can 
do about it – they either accept or they have their licenses revoked. This source can be 
computed as follows: 
 
𝑆2 = (𝑖𝐵 − 𝑖𝑅)𝑅 (2) 
where IR represents the interest rate that the central bank has to pay for the required reserves 
place by the domestic sector with the central bank. 
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3. The excess monetization, i.e. the role that the inflation tax and the GDP growth rate 
has on the decrease of the debt-to-GDP ratio will be included, even after 2004 (the results of 
this excess monetization should be included because it will be 0 after 2004). The excess 
monetization can be computed as follows: 
 
𝑆3 = ∆𝐵𝐶 − (𝑛 + 𝜋)𝐵𝐶  (3) 
where n represents the GDP growth rate and π the inflation rate. This last source of revenue 
can be understood as the extra debt that the government can place with the central bank due 
to the increase in inflation and the increase in the GDP (which in turn decreases the debt-to-
GDP ratio). 
 
So, the total seigniorage generated by the government and the central bank is: 
𝑆𝑇 = 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 + 𝑆3 (4) 
 
A problem of this study is the lack of data on the interest rate of government bonds for 
the period 1990-2005 (at least from our searches in different databases and queries to the 
National Bank of Romania we could not find such data). The fact that there is not public data 
for this variable and that NBR did not have such information could indicate that the Romanian 
government couldn’t place public debt in the form of long term state bonds (for a period of 10 
years) due to the fact that it was a post-communist country in transition and it had a very 
unstable investment position. This is to be expected from such countries; most of the countries 
of this profile do not issue public debt, since they use international financial institutions for 
credits. Indeed, a quick look at Romania’s country rating confirms that only around 2005 the 
prospects for investment for this country improved (Country Economy, 2018).  
Indeed, a more in-depth review of the literature about the public debt market in 
Romania, will show that the government hardly issued debt, especially in the 1990s decade; 
for instance, medium and long-term debt was only issued for the first time in 1999 (Stoica, 
2002; Pop et al., 2012). 
Still, this doesn’t mean that there were no alternatives for investing in interest bearing 
securities in Romania before 2005. The question now is what is the best indicator for the 
aggregate interest rate? In order to avoid any debates over the right interest rate we have 
used the long term interest rate for convergence purposes as the right indicator (see 
European Central Bank, 2018) for the period 2005-2016. But for the period 1990-2005, data 
were also lacking from ECB’s database. So we came up with an estimate of this. 
We computed a synthetic indicator using the most relevant factors identified in the 
literature (Holston et al., 2017; Hsing, 2015; Ichiue and Shimizu, 2012) that influence the 
interest rate of public securities: the inflation rate from previous year (assuming that the 
expectation of the securities buyers are made on the basis of the previous year inflation 
rates), the debt-to-GDP ratio, the growth rate of GDP (which should influence the demand 
positively if the perspectives for growth are high) and the development of the country 
measured as GDP per capita (the more developed a country, the higher the demand for 
interest bearing assets and for government bonds implicitly). The model is the following: 
 
î𝐵 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑑𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑔𝑑𝑝 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
(5) 
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The model presents a high coefficient of determination (0.71) and was estimated with 
panel data from ten Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) for the period 2005-
2016 using fixed-effects. The results of the estimation are robust and statistically significant 
(for more details see Annex).  
In relation to the possibility of existence of a Laffer curve of the inflation tax we have 
employed an OLS model where we accounted for eventual nonlinearities by squaring and 
used data from our findings. The model is the following: 
 
𝑆 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙
2 (6) 
 
The factor that will influence the potential seigniorage gains from adopting the euro in 
Romania is that the country will get a certain share of the benefits from a much larger 
central bank with a much larger balance sheet (Grauwe, 2009, p. 72). The issue whether 
these smaller share of much higher benefits will top the bigger share of smaller benefits is 
up for debate and computations. Theoretically, the seigniorage considered by ECB is the 
monetary income, i.e. the profits made by the national central banks of the Eurosystem on 
account of assets they hold to back their monetary base, and the shares earmarked for each 
country from the total should be accordingly to their asset shares in ECB. Still, in a union 
where there is total freedom of movement for persons and capital, such basis for dividing 
the revenue from central banks is quite unreliable; that is why, the accorded division scheme 
is based on the country specific percentage of population and GDP with respect to the 
Eurozone (Smaghi and Gros, 2000). 
Fortunately, Gros (2004) provided us with a very helpful methodology2 that can 








+ 1) 𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 − 𝑚𝑟𝑜] (7) 
where r stands for the interest rate, both in Romania and Eurozone (this assumption is quite 
realistic given the fact that is one of the admission criteria), yRO represents the ratio between 
Romania’s and Eurozone GDP/capita and the lower case meuro and mro stands for the ratios 
between currency and GDP in Eurozone and Romania, respectively. Due to the fact that it is 
very difficult to predict these variables, both for Romania and the Eurozone, our 
computations were done for the period 2007 (the year Romania joined EU) – 2017, thus 
giving us an idea of how much bigger would have been the gains from seigniorage if 
Romania would have adopted the euro at any point between these years.   
 
4. THE RESULTS 
 
The results in respect to seigniorage generation (Figure no. 1) show that seigniorage 
was a constant source of revenues for the government in period of 1990’s, when the country 
passed a long and painful transition to market economy. Noticeable is the 10.8% of the GDP 
in its peak year (1994) when the annual inflation was at the staggering figure of 136%. This 
results are quite surprising; in the previous three years, the inflation rates were even higher 
(170.2% 210.4% and 256.1%, respectively), but the peak was reached in 1994. This peculiar 
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observation seems to suggest that when inflation for Romania surpasses more or less 130% 
it already enters on the diminishing revenue side of the Laffer curve (this inflation rate 
seems to be the one where the peak of seigniorage generation is achieved). The policy 
implication for this finding is quite profound; the executive, not knowing the exact limit of 
the efficiency curve of this inflation driven seigniorage, had fallen into the right-hand side of 
it, imposing excessive costs on an already financially impoverished domestic population. 
Although using a very similar methodology as Hochreiter et al. (1996), our results are 
quite different (for the year 1993 for instance, the difference is 18.6% of the GDP in terms 
of estimate). This is explained by the fact that the above mentioned authors have used (due 
to the lack of data) instead of the interest rate for government securities the inflation rate; 
this is why their results are quite extreme. But, as we have showed in our regression 
regarding the determinants of the long run interest rates for the government securities in 
Eastern Europe, a marginal increase in the inflation with one percentage point only increases 
the interest rate with 0.348% (see below in Annex). 
 
 
Figure no. 1 – Distribution of seigniorage generation by sources in Romania 1990-2016 
Source: own computation 
 
Also, one can notice the high drop in seigniorage in 1996, which translated in losses for 
the government (in fact it is the only year in our sample when the executive generated a 
negative seigniorage). This has to do with what Zaman (2002) pointed out in his work: 80% of 
the central bank’s loans for the period up to 1996 were handed to two highly unperformant 
public banks, controlled by the politicians – Bancorex and Banca Agricola. In the eve of the 
1996 elections, these two financial entities had to be bailed-out by the central bank with public 
money (thus diverting central bank’s assets from investments in interest bearing assets).  
Another result that stand out is the high variation (this is 11.8% of GDP) and two main 
periods of great drops (1996 and 2000). These two observations, both in variation and the 
existence of drops in seigniorage levels can be explained through the fact that Romania 
passed from being a communist country to a market economy with a nonindependent central 
bank and then again passed to a market economy with an independent central bank (this, of 
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NBR to adopt the rules of the games, as stated in Hochreiter et al. (1996) is a reason for 
which we can observe very high variations in seigniorage in Romania in the 90’s and early 
2000’s. This phases supposed structural changes that came at a cost in terms of seigniorage. 
This is very evident in the period previous to 2004, when preparations were in process to 
give more independence to the central bank and when the seigniorage dropped so low that it 
became close to 0. Indeed, in our results it can be seen that the after 2005 (after NBR 
became legally independent), the variance in seigniorage has dropped a great deal and the 
annual values for it are very stable (close to 2% of the GDP).  
In relation to the sources, one can notice also that the most reliable and the most 
“lucrative” was S1, i.e. the revenue generated from difference between the interest gained on the 
assets and the interest paid on the liabilities of the central bank; even after 2005 this sources 
brings in the highest bulk of the seigniorage. A very interesting finding is that the Romanian 
executive did not take advantage of the excessive monetization source (S3) in the period 
previous of central bank independence, this being obvious through the fact that S3 presents 
negative values in 11 out of 15 years from 1990 to 2004. Of course, after this year this source 
had totally disappeared, due to the legislative framework that prohibits the central bank to 
operate in the primary market of public debt. This puzzling fact has two reasons; when 
generating seigniorage using the instrument of monetary policy (i.e. inflation), the other sources 
become secondary in importance and the second reason is that before 2004 independence, the 
executive needed some time to deplete the balance of the NBR of any remaining state securities 
in order to comply with the already agreed legal framework for central bank independence. 
For comparative purposes we also added Figure no. 2, where besides the results from 
Figure no. 1 there are also the results of seigniorage estimation using the classical method 
(monetary seigniorage plus seigniorage as opportunity cost plus the foregone interest due to 
the placement of the state debt with the central bank). A simple look at this graph shows the 
shortcomings of the latter – the even higher variability and the upward bias of the 
estimation, i.e. extremely high values (with a peak of 19.05% of the GDP reached in 1992 – 
interestingly, neither in this case this peak was not reached in 1993 when the inflation was 
the highest). The trend though, seems to suggest the same thing: as the independence of the 
central bank was achieved and as the economy became gradually more performant, this 
source of revenue for the government budget decreased. 
 
 
Figure no. 2 – Comparison between the results estimated using Rovelli (1994) method  
and the classic method 
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In relation to the Laffer curve of the inflation tax, our results suggest that the 
relationship with the squared term is nonsignificant. Although the linear relation between 
the two is significant, the coefficient of determination is not so high (R2 = 0.3). The 
scatterplot with a quadratic term does not seem to indicate the existence of a Laffer curve 
(Figure no. 3); in fact, due to the high dispersion of the points, the line does not show any 
non-linear curvature. We cannot know for sure if this is the highest possible revenue that 
can be achieved through inflation. This is to be expected due to the small sample (27 
observations) and the fact that in our methodology, the impact the inflation has on 
seigniorage generation is diluted by adding more variables.  
 
 
Figure no. 3 – Scatter plot inflation-seigniorage with quadratic regression line and confidence interval 
Source: own computation 
 
Still, one can determine this Laffer curve by using a quadratic regression line between 
inflation and the monetary seigniorage. As depicted in Figure no. 4, the results in this case 
are clearer than before. A clear curvilinear trend exists with a peak between 110% and 140% 
inflation rate. Thus the 136% inflation rate that we have identified as the peak in our 
computations seems to be in line with these findings. The results fail to meet the rigorous 
scientific standards for significance and the regression fit line with the 95% confidence 
intervals spreads does not accommodate many of the observations. This is due to the 
shortcoming stated above (small sample) and due to the fact that the empirical data presents 
so extreme values of inflation that the leverage of those observations bias the regression 
curve. Even so, we also employed the model used by Cagan (1956) to determine the peak of 
seigniorage in a high inflation economy and the results are in line with the graphics 





) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑙𝑛𝑌 (8) 
where M/P represents the real value of the monetary base (taken as M2), i is the interest rate and 
Y is the real value of the output. In this model, b coefficient should be between 1/2 and 1/3, so 
the peak will be reached at values of monetary base growth between 2 and 3. In our empirical 
results, the value of b is -0.85, so the peak will be reached at 1/-(-0.85), i.e. at 117% inflation. 
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Figure no. 4 – Scatter plot inflation-monetary seigniorage with regression line and confidence 
interval and a leverage-normalized residuals square; the numbers of the points in the graph 
indicate the ID number of the year 
Source: own computation 
 
The results for the hypothetical gains are presented in Figure no. 5 and shows that as 
Romania continue to converge with the rest of the Eurozone in terms of GDP/capita, these 
gains will continue to drop. An interesting effect is observed regarding the currency-to-GDP 
ratio: some of the gains are made due to the fact that fact the difference between the 
Eurozone and Romanian cash-to-GDP ratio is positive; if Romania were to adopt the euro, it 
is supposed that it would have the same ratio as the rest of the Eurozone, thus gaining 
additional seigniorage from it. Still, the small values and even smaller expected future 
values cannot represent for the Romanian executive a budgetary incentive to pass to euro. 
The wish to adopt the single currency is motivated by other rationales. 
 
 
Figure no. 5 – Hypothetical seigniorage gains from euro adoption in Romania between 2007-2016 
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In this paper we have shown that seigniorage was a constant form of revenue generation 
for the Romanian executive in the period of the economic transition in the decade of the 90’s, 
but as the economy improved and as the “rules of the game” were slowly adopted as 
prerequisites for the European Union accession, this source became insignificant. Furthermore, 
this source will not totally disappear for the executive, because as we have showed the 
distributed fiscal revenue from ECB to Romania is expected to be at least, or even a little, 
above the present values; what is really lost for good is the possibility of using your own 
monetary policy and the monopoly of creating money in order to generate fiscal revenue. 
In our perspective, this is a good opportunity for the authorities to prove their 
commitment to fiscal discipline and to gain even further credibility in the eyes of the 
international creditors; after all, a high seigniorage level indicates a very weak and 
unthrusting government that generates its revenues from inflation tax. So, we believe that 
the implication of this process of giving up the sovereignty of the monetary policy is that the 
Romania government should become even less dependent on this source of revenue and 
should adopt a reform of the fiscal system.  
Referring to our research work we have to recognize the limitations of our findings. 
The calculations were greatly influenced by our estimate of the rate of interest on long term 
government issued debt, but in our opinion this is the best way we could have dealt with the 
problem of missing data. Furthermore, the issue of extreme values of empirical data (like 
inflation) affected the statistical significance of some of the findings, but still, knowing this 
fact is already an advance in the study of this issue. We are determined to continue this 
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ANNEX 1 
Table no. 1 – Linear regression for the long term interest rate estimation purposes,  
with country specific fixed effects 
Interest rate  Coef.   St. Err..  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf.  Interval]  Sig 
 Lag inflation 0.349 0.053 6.54 0.000 0.243 0.455 *** 
 Debt to GDP ratio -0.041 0.011 -3.66 0.000 -0.063 -0.019 *** 
 GDP growth -0.187 0.036 -5.24 0.000 -0.258 -0.116 *** 
 GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 -2.31 0.023 0.000 0.000 ** 
 Constant 7.962 0.996 7.99 0.000 5.987 9.938 *** 
Mean dependent var. 4.755 SD dependent var.  2.250  
R-squared  0.626 Number of obs.   119.000  
F-test   43.973 Prob. > F  0.000  
Akaike crit. (AIC) 391.571 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 405.467  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
Table no. 2 – Linear regression using Cagan’s equation for determining the value of constant b 
M2 monetary base  Coef.  St. Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% Conf.  Interval]  Sig 
 Interest rate -0.857 0.238 -3.60 0.001 -1.349 -0.366 *** 
 Log real GDP 0.957 0.021 46.43 0.000 0.914 0.999 *** 
 Constant -0.438 0.309 -1.42 0.168 -1.075 0.198  
Mean dependent var. 11.901 SD dependent var.  2.957  
R-squared  0.993 Number of obs   27.000  
F-test   1820.658 Prob > F  0.000  
Akaike crit. (AIC) 4.368 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 8.256  





1 These are the statistics for EU Member States relate to interest rates for long-term government bonds 
denominated in Euro for euro area Member States and in national currencies for Member States that 
have not adopted the Euro at the time of publication. Where no harmonized long-term government 
bond yields are available, proxies derived from private sector bond yields or interest rate indicators are 
presented, where available. For more detail consult European Central Bank (2018). 
2 In this formula only the seigniorage as opportunity cost is accounted for which is quite alright 
because the ECB cannot generate seigniorage by buying Eurozone sovereign debt. Including the 
seigniorage gain from required reserves would have overcomplicated the model and would have not 
gave us a very different results.   
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